From the late nineteenth century until the eve of the Second World War, Britain's naval requirements were formally calculated on the basis of officially sanctioned naval 'standards.' These standards specified which power, combination of powers, or number of powers Britain should match in naval strength, and normally resulted from a careful balancing of strategic, diplomatic, and financial considerations. Statesmen considered not only the size of navy needed to defend Britain's vital interests, but also how much the state could afford to spend, and which threats it could realistically expect to face. Insuring against all possible dangers with a massive and sustained naval construction program was prohibitively expensive and would have undermined Britain's economic strength, thereby weakening its overall strategic position. Moreover, the end result of such a program would have borne little relation to Britain's genuine security needs. Conversely, failure to provide against real threats would encourage aggressors and leave Britain dangerously exposed if war did occur. Responsible decision-makers agreed that the navy had to be strong enough to provide security against any reasonably probable foe, but also that expensive preparations against too many powers must be avoided. The responsibility for weighing these considerations and defining the navy's standard of strength rested with Britain's civil authorities. In theory, the Admiralty's role in this process was only an advisory one; in practice, however, the navy often exerted considerable influence over which standard the government adopted and how it was executed.
2 The Royal Navy, Sea power and Strategy policy. In the first place, they have usually failed to note that the meaning of the standard varied considerably according to time and circumstances. As Captain Tom Phillips noted in 1937, ' The term "One-Power Naval Standard" is extremely vague and means different things to different people.'
1 Cabinets and cabinet committees modified the formal definition of the standard on a regular basis, while the Admiralty and Treasury engaged in a running battle over how these definitions would be interpreted and applied. Hence, generalizations about the meaning and significance of the standard seldom hold good for the whole of the period when it was in force. Other problems have arisen trom the tendency to treat the one-power standard as synonymous with the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty. In fact, the standard had a life of its own. It was adopted before the Washington disarmament conference was held, and it remained in use after quantitative treaty limitations had disappeared. The Washington Treaty and its successors did indeed restrict the strength of the Royal Navy in certain classes of warship, but they did not Jay down a minimum naval strength for Britain. Hence, the principal role of the one-power standard was to guide decision-makers in their deliberations over how much of the treaty figures Britain needed or could afford to maintain. The impact of quantitative treaty limitations on Britain's naval position and the effect of naval standards on the size and composition of the Royal Navy are almost entirely separate issues. 2 Historians have also tended to conflate naval standards with actual seapower. They often suggest that the naval standard Britain maintained was synonymous with its real naval strength. Thus, it is argued that the adoption of a one-power standard after the First World War was a sign of Britain's relative decline as a great power -that a onepower standard was, by definition, inferior to the earlier two-power standard, irrespective of Britain's security requirements or the size of the foreign navies in question. The one-power standard has also been identified as the reason why the navy was under-strength during the 1930s, when Britain faced no less than three potentially hostile powers. Moreover, some historians have implied that the navy accepted this standard because it either miscalculated or misunderstood how great its requirements would be in the event of a war on two or three fronts. These charges are groundless. The one-power standard was imposed on the navy from above, and the Admiralty struggled to meet its strategic requirements as best it could within this framework. During the 1920s, a one-power standard relative to the United States met Britain's real strategic needs as well as the two-power standard had after 1889.
